California, United States of America
The following excerpt is from Estate of Ivy, 22 Cal.App.4th 873, 28 Cal.Rptr.2d 16 (Cal. App. 1994):
Contrary to appellant's contentions, these documents would have been highly relevant to appellant's actual knowledge of the probate homestead [22 Cal.App.4th 879] petition and hence might have conclusively shown the lack of merit to her claim of extrinsic fraud. Two such documents came to light despite appellant's initial stonewalling, an exchange of correspondence between appellant and the then trustee showing that in 1983 appellant was aware of the possibility of a probate homestead and had no objection to it if the home would revert to the trust upon the death of decedent's widow. As pointed out by respondents, appellant's refusal to make discovery means that no one will know what other documents appellant had in her possession conclusively showing her notice or knowledge of the probate homestead petition. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding the appropriate sanction was an issue sanction finding that appellant's objections were without merit and that appellant's claims of conflict of interest were barred by res judicata or were untimely. (Code Civ.Proc., 2023, subd. (b)(2); Kuhns v. State of California (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 982, 988-989, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 773.) Appellant suggests the issue sanction was overly broad in finding that all of appellant's objections to the third account were without merit, based on appellant's refusal to make discovery relevant to the probate homestead and extrinsic fraud objections. This is not persuasive, because in response to the trustee's prior motion for summary adjudication of appellant's objections appellant addressed only the homestead/extrinsic fraud issue, abandoning other objections.
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