How have courts treated third parties' "fundamental rights" under section 4370 of the California Marriage Act?

Property rights have not been classified as "fundamental rights" invoking a requirement that legislation or its application be judged by a standard of "strict scrutiny." (Hernandez v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1981) 30 Cal.3d 70, 81, 177 Cal.Rptr. 566, 634 P.2d 917.) Here, application of section 4370 required third parties to deliver their property--money--to wife. Third parties have not contended application of the statute impinged on any "fundamental rights." We conclude no "fundamental rights" of third parties are at issue here. (See Hernandez, supra, at p. 81, 177 Cal.Rptr. 566, 634 P.2d 917.) It goes without

Page 767

Third parties' initial contention of unfairness is that they cannot be compelled to pay wife's fees without any consideration of the merits of [187 Cal.App.3d 52] the dispute and simply because they had money and she did not. They correctly note that the obligation of one spouse to pay fees to the other spouse, based exclusively on monetary need, has been justified as a component of the marital obligation of support. (See In re Marriage of Pallesi, supra, 73 Cal.App.3d at p. 427, 140 Cal.Rptr. 842; Henry v. Henry (1960) 182 Cal.App.2d 707, 712-713, 6 Cal.Rptr. 418.) They assert that since neither corporation nor partnership was married to wife and had no legal obligation to support her, the justification for a pendente lite fee award fails.