How have courts interpreted "vague statutory language" in the California Code of Civil Procedure regarding nudity?

"[V]ague statutory language ... creates the danger that police, prosecutors, judges and juries will lack sufficient standards to reach their decisions, thus opening the door to arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement of the law." (Pryor v. Municipal Court (1979) 25 Cal.3d 238, 252, 158 Cal.Rptr. 330, 599 P.2d 636.)

RICHARDSON, Justice, dissenting.

I respectfully dissent. The majority overrules our own decision in Crownover v. Musick (1973) 9 Cal.3d 405, 509 P.2d 497, and, in doing so, bars the County of Santa Clara from enforcing its nude dancing ordinance. In my view, the majority seriously errs. Our Crownover analysis remains eminently sound and fully supports the constitutional validity of the county's ordinance.

The challenged ordinance, of course, is presumed to be constitutional. (City of Industry v. Willey (1970) 11 Cal.App.3d 658, 663, 89 Cal.Rptr. 922.) Moreover, it is solidly based upon two legitimate and substantial governmental interests: the traditional interest of local communities in promoting public morality and general welfare, and the emerging concern over the social harm caused by the sexual exploitation and degradation of women for profit. We should sustain the ordinance.

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