How have courts interpreted the term "destructive device" in the context of the unlawful possession of a firearm?

^[14]"Although framed as sufficiency of the evidence arguments, these are statutory interpretation arguments that we review de novo." United States v. Hong, 938 F.3d 1040, 1050 (9th Cir. 2019).

^[15]"Both of the statutes under which [Schaefer] was convicted [in Counts 3 and 7] prohibit the unlawful possession of a 'firearm,' which is defined to include a 'destructive device.'" United States v. Kirkland, 909 F.3d 1049, 1052 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(3)(D); 26 U.S.C. 5845(a)(8)). We discuss these statutes together because "[b]oth statutes . . . define the term 'destructive device' in almost identical language." Id. (citing 921(a)(4); 5845(f)).

^[16]We have noted that "subsection (C) applies only to materials that have not yet been assembled into a whole," while, "[i]n contrast, subsection (A) applies only to an assembled device, i.e., parts that have been converted into a bomb or similar device." United States v. Lussier, 128 F.3d 1312, 1314-15 (9th Cir. 1997). This distinction matters because if the device falls under subsection (A) as a "bomb," it constitutes a "destructive device" per se. If, on the other hand, the device falls under subsection (C) as a "combination of parts," the government is required to prove an intent element: either that the device was "designed for use" as a "destructive device" or that the defendant "intended to use the device" as a "destructive device." Id. ("[W]e have consistently held that although either intent or design is required as an element of the crime under subsection (C), a showing of intent is not required under subsection (A).").