California, United States of America
The following excerpt is from People v. Shannon, 46 Cal.App.4th 1365, 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 416 (Cal. App. 1996):
Courts which have modified the standard formulation of the intent required for voluntary manslaughter have done so at their peril. For instance, in People v. Fusselman (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 289, 120 Cal.Rptr. 282, the court found the instruction on the relationship of the diminished capacity defense to the specific intent required for voluntary manslaughter to be erroneous on its face where the court defined the necessary intent as the intent "to commit murder." The court explained: "[T]he intent which is required for first degree murder, as well as voluntary manslaughter, is to kill; we know of no judicially recognized mental state of an intent 'to murder.' " (Id. at p. 304, 120 Cal.Rptr. 282.)
In People v. Germany (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 414, 116 Cal.Rptr. 841, the court found the instructions given on the intent required for voluntary manslaughter to be erroneous where the court struck all references to "specific intent" and substituted "criminal intent." The court agreed with appellant that these instructions could have potentially misled the jury into believing that the crime of voluntary manslaughter required only a general intent. This was error because "[v]oluntary manslaughter is a specific intent crime" requiring an intent to kill. (Id. at p. 418, 116 Cal.Rptr. 841, citing People v. Gorshen, supra, 51 Cal.2d at pp. 732-733, 336 P.2d 492.)
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