How have courts interpreted the privilege against self-incrimination in a criminal case?

In Howard, the trial court advised the defendant of his rights to a jury trial and confrontation in connection with a section 667.5, subdivision (b) allegation of a prior prison term. But the court overlooked the privilege against self-incrimination; no admonition or waiver of that right was given or received. Nevertheless, the defendant had been expressly told that he had a right to force the prosecutor to prove the prior conviction in a trial, at which time he would have the right to a jury determination and to confront the evidence against him. He was represented by counsel, and there was a strong factual basis for the plea. As to the defective waiver of the right against self-incrimination, the court observed that " '[a] plea of guilty is the most complete form of self-incrimination....' " (People v. Howard, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 1180, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 268, 824 P.2d 1315.) Under these circumstances the court held that the admission of the prior prison term was voluntary and intelligent despite the omission of an explicit admonition of the privilege against self-incrimination.