How have courts interpreted the meaning of section 3333.4 of the California Vehicle Accident Prevention Act?

California, United States of America


The following excerpt is from Horwich v. Superior Court, 21 Cal.4th 272, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 222, 980 P.2d 927 (Cal. 1999):

Defendant contends the prefatory reference to "a person" in subdivision (a) is definitive in construing section 3333.4. Our interpretation, however, better follows the grammatical structure and logic of the statutory language taken as a whole in light of the electorate's intent. His construction reads "a person" in isolation without taking into account the "if" proviso in subdivision (a), which provides that application is limited by subdivision (a)(2) and (3), restricting recovery only by the "injured person" who is uninsured. (Cf. People v. Ledesma (1997) 16 Cal.4th 90, 97, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 610, 939 P.2d 1310.) "The meaning of a statute may not be determined from a single word or sentence; the words must be construed in context, and provisions relating to the same subject matter must be harmonized to the extent possible." (Lungren v. Deukmejian (1988) 45 Cal.3d 727, 735, 248 Cal.Rptr. 115, 755 P.2d 299.) Moreover, it would render "[t]he injured person" surplusage. (See also 3333.4, subd. (a)(1) [prohibiting recovery of noneconomic damages if "[t]he injured person" was convicted of driving under the influence at the time of the accident].) Under defendant's interpretation the statute would effectively read as follows: "[A] person shall not recover non-economic losses to compensate for pain, suffering, inconvenience, physical impairment, disfigurement, and other nonpecuniary damages if ... [p][p] ... the owner of a vehicle involved in the accident ... was not insured as required by the financial responsibility laws of this state .... [or] [p] ... the operator of a vehicle involved in the accident ... can not establish his or her financial responsibility as required by the financial responsibility laws of this state."

Principles of statutory construction also counsel that we should avoid an interpretation that leads to anomalous or absurd consequences. (Calatayud v. State of California (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1057, 1072, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 202, 959 P.2d 360.) Defendant's reading of the statute could lead to the broad interpretation that no one could recover noneconomic damages when an automobile owner or operator is uninsured. It would thus follow that if a non-negligent

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