How have courts interpreted the meaning of possession in the context of money laundering and drug dealing?

To assist us in our interpretation of the text, we look to other situations in which courts examining statutes requiring possession have recognized that an interpretation requiring actual physical possession could lead to unfair or untoward results. In such situations, which arise principally in criminal contexts, courts have adopted a broader interpretation of "possession." Examples are statutes penalizing the possession of contraband and statutes penalizing laundering of money that has been in the defendants possession. Courts have utilized the concept of "constructive" control or possession, whereby an individual is deemed to possess items even when the individual does not actually have immediate physical possession of the item. See, e.g. , United States v. Vasquez , 654 F.3d 880, 88586 (9th Cir. 2011).

The possession of a controlled substance is a crime under our drug laws. See , e.g. , 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) ("[I]t shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to ... possess ... a controlled substance"). When defendants charged with violating this and similar statutes have argued that actual physical possession of the contraband is required, courts have rejected the argument, explaining that a demonstration of constructive possession or control of the contraband is sufficient. See, e.g. , United States v. Disla , 805 F.2d 1340, 1350 (9th Cir. 1986) (observing that "[w]e have upheld many convictions [under 841(a)(1) ] under the theory of constructive possession"); United States v. Ruiz , 462 F.3d 1082, 1088 (9th Cir. 2006) ("[W]e have defined possession as having actual or constructive control.").

With respect to money laundering, the criminal statute penalizes the transfer of unlawfully obtained proceeds. 18 U.S.C. 1957(f)(2) (defining "criminally derived property" as "any property constituting, or derived from, proceeds obtained from a criminal offense"). Courts have held that to show that a defendant "obtained" proceeds, there must be a demonstration of possession or control. See United States v. Piervinanzi , 23 F.3d 670, 677 (2d Cir. 1994). Defendants charged under this statute have argued that if a defendant merely directed a transfer of proceeds without ever placing the funds in the defendants

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