How have courts interpreted the distinction between "separate occasions" under Section D of the Criminal Code?

(1) People v. Corona, supra, 206 Cal.App.3d 13, 253 Cal.Rptr. 327, is factually distinguishable from this case. In Corona, the prosecutor took the position there were only two episodes of sex offenses, stating, " 'it is difficult to argue that the oral copulation and foreign object rape, occurring just prior to the rapes, are themselves separate episodes.' " (Id. at p. 16, 253 Cal.Rptr. 327.) Such a concession is remarkable since subdivision (d) provides "neither the duration of time between crimes, nor whether or not the defendant lost or abandoned his or her opportunity to attack, shall be, in and of itself, determinative on the issue of whether the crimes in question occurred on separate occasions." In any case, based upon the prosecutor's position, it is not surprising the Third District upheld the trial court's imposition of consecutive sentences on two "separate occasions" under subdivision (d). Here, there is no such concession from the prosecutor.

(2) People v. Pena, supra, 7 Cal.App.4th 1294, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 550, which relies upon Corona, merely upholds the trial court's findings on the issue of "separate occasions" noting an appellate court is "not at liberty to overturn the result unless no reasonable trier of fact could decide that there was a reasonable opportunity for reflection." (Id. at p. 1314, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 550.)