How have courts interpreted the definition of "viciousness" in sentencing for a violent crime?

Our conclusion finds persuasive support in People v. Reed (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 489, 492, 203 Cal.Rptr. 659, where the court held a defendant was properly sentenced to the upper term for committing mayhem in a vicious manner. Defendant claimed that, because viciousness is an element of mayhem, it was improper for the court to consider viciousness when sentencing her to the upper term. The court rejected this argument because the statutory definition does not specifically cite viciousness as an element of the crime. (See also People v. Dixie (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 852, 856, 159 Cal.Rptr. 717.) Further, the Reed court felt the language of the statute permits no inference that viciousness is necessary to commit mayhem.