How have courts dealt with the issue of bias in denying a motion for a third strike?

Furthermore, the denial of the Romero motion was not an abuse of discretion by the trial court. In denying defendant's Romero motion, the court explained that, "[r]ather than being a non-violent crime where all of the factors brought to the court's attention by the defense might be compelling, in fact these are just five more violent and serious offenses after the defendant has been given a second chance, a third chance and fourth chance in the ten years since his strike priors were accumulated. [] . . . [Defendant], notwithstanding the fact he's most likely a very fine fellow and loves his children, et cetera, falls squarely within . . . the so-called spirit of the three strikes law . . . ." We believe that " ' in light of the nature and circumstances of [defendant's] present felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the particulars of his background, character, and prospects," the court's refusal to strike one or more of defendant's strikes was not "so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it." (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 377.)

Third, our determination that the statement does not reflect actual bias nor indicate the probability of actual bias on the part of the trial court is further supported by defendant's failure to raise the issue below. Defendant never expressed any concern that the court was prejudiced against him, or any concern that the court had already determined its ruling on an anticipated Romero motion. Defendant also did not request recusal of the judge. Defendant's willingness to let the Romero motion proceed to hearing and decision many months later without a charge of bias against the court "strongly suggests" the claim is "without merit." (People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1112; see also People v. Tappan (1968) 266 Cal.App.2d 812, 816-817 [although

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