How have courts considered the risk of unfair prejudice against probative value under Rule 403?

4 The record reveals that the court did not explicitly balance the probative value against the danger of unfair prejudice nor expressly rule on the issue. While we may infer that the court implicitly conducted the Rule 403 balancing, on remand, "we remind the district court that its duty to weigh the factors explicitly maintains the appearance of justice by showing the parties that the court recognized and followed the dictates of the law, and facilitates immeasurably the process of appellate review." United States v. Johnson, 820 F.2d 1065, 1069 n. 2 (9th Cir.1987).

5 Defendants additionally argue that the district court's failure to give an adequate limiting instruction requires reversal. The record reveals, however, that defense counsel failed to provide the court with an adequate limiting instruction and failed to object to the weak instruction the court in fact gave. Under these circumstances, any error resulting from the court's failure to give an adequate limiting instruction is waived. See Lucero v. Stewart, 892 F.2d 52, 56 (9th Cir.1989).

6 Defendants additionally argue in the alternative that even if no single error requires reversal, cumulatively the district court's rulings in this case were so prejudicial that the defendants were not fairly tried and reversal is appropriate due to the combined impact of the errors. See United States v. McLister, 608 F.2d 785, 791 (9th Cir.1979). Since we conclude that reversal is appropriate due to some of the district court's specific errors in instructing witnesses and admitting evidence, we do not address defendants' attempted reliance on this amorphous doctrine.