How have courts and juries treated race, ethnic or ethnic diversity in jury selection?

Even the best intentions of courts or legislatures cannot infringe on the fundamental right of a representative cross-section: "Tendencies, no matter how slight, toward the selection of jurors by any method other than a process which will insure a trial by a representative group are undermining processes, weakening the institution of jury trial, and should be sturdily resisted. That the motives influencing such tendencies may be of the best must not blind us to the dangers of allowing any encroachment whatsoever on this essential right." (Glasser v. United States, supra, 315 U.S. 60, 86, 62 S.Ct. 457, 472.)

Justice Mosk, writing for this court, explained that "The rationale of these decisions, often unstated, is that in our heterogeneous society jurors will inevitably belong to diverse and often overlapping groups defined by race, religion, ethnic or national origin, sex, age, education, occupation, economic condition, place of residence, and political affiliation; that it is unrealistic to expect jurors to be devoid of opinions, preconceptions, or even deep-rooted biases derived from their life experiences in such groups; and hence that the only practical way to achieve an overall impartiality is to encourage the representation of a variety of such groups on the jury so that the respective biases of their members, to the extent they are antagonistic, will tend to cancel each other out." (People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d 258, 266-267, 148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748.)

[49 Cal.3d 565]