How has the US Supreme Court interpreted carjacking legislation in the context of the Sixth Amendment?
California, United States of America
The following excerpt is from People v. Saez, 189 Cal.Rptr.3d 72, 237 Cal.App.4th 1177 (Cal. App. 2015):
20 In Jones v. United States, supra, 526 U.S. 227, 119 S.Ct. 1215, the high court held that a federal carjacking statute defined three distinct offenses, not a single crime with a choice of three maximum penalties, two of them dependent on sentencing factors exempt from the requirements of charge and jury verdict, in part to avoid the Sixth Amendment concerns the latter interpretation would raise. (Id. at pp. 229, 240, 243, fn. 6, 119 S.Ct. 1215.)
20 In Jones v. United States, supra, 526 U.S. 227, 119 S.Ct. 1215, the high court held that a federal carjacking statute defined three distinct offenses, not a single crime with a choice of three maximum penalties, two of them dependent on sentencing factors exempt from the requirements of charge and jury verdict, in part to avoid the Sixth Amendment concerns the latter interpretation would raise. (Id. at pp. 229, 240, 243, fn. 6, 119 S.Ct. 1215.)
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