How has the special circumstance of murder-by-poison been interpreted?

People v. Catlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 31, 26 P.3d 357, this court upheld the murder-by-poison special circumstance finding against a claim that it violates the Eighth Amendment in that it merely repeats the elements of first degree murder-by-poison. In rejecting that challenge, we observed in relevant part that murder by poison is particularly reprehensible: The murderer acts surreptitiously and thereby prevents the victim any chance at self-defense. (Id. at p. 159, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 31, 26 P.3d 357.) Like the murderer who poisons his victim, the murderer who kills by lying in wait acts surreptitiously, concealing

[62 Cal.4th 637]

himself or his purpose and making a surprise attack on his victim from a position of advantage, thereby denying the victim any chance of escape, aid, or self-defense. It is no surprise that a murder committed by lying in wait historically has been viewed as " a particularly heinous and repugnant crime. " (People v. Edelbacher (1989) 47 Cal.3d 983, 1023, 254 Cal.Rptr. 586, 766 P.2d 1.) That a crime historically has been considered more reprehensible than other murders provides "a rational basis for distinguishing those murderers who deserve to be considered for the death penalty from those who do not." (

[197 Cal.Rptr.3d 491]

People v. Davenport (1985) 41 Cal.3d 247, 270, 221 Cal.Rptr. 794, 710 P.2d 861, see id. at p. 269, 221 Cal.Rptr. 794, 710 P.2d 861 [the torture-murderer's " "cold blooded intent to inflict pain for personal gain or satisfaction" " sets him apart from others who commit murder with malice aforethought and renders torture murder to be one of the most reprehensible crimes].)