How has the prosecutor in the retrial of a burglary case treated the fact that the prior crime was not violent?

Finally, the fact that Sorto had a prior felony conviction was not emphasized by the prosecutor. In the first trial, a detective testified about the specifics of the burglary, and the prosecutor stressed the detective's testimony in her opening and closing statements, urging the jury to find that the prior crime and the current charge were part of a common plan or scheme. (People v. Sorto, supra, F058933, p. 5.) In the retrial, there was no evidence on the specifics of Sorto's prior crime, and his conviction was not mentioned at all in the prosecutor's arguments. The jury was also instructed that prior crimes could be considered in assessing credibility. Under the totality of the circumstances, including Sorto's uncontested testimony that his crime was not violent, we conclude it is not reasonably likely the outcome would have been different had the prosecutor asked only if Sorto had been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.

Sorto also claims that his attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to object to the characterization of his prior conviction as "serious and violent." Given our conclusion that there was no prejudice, his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim also fails. (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 694 [to prevail on ineffective-assistance claim, "defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different"].)