How has the doctrine of "self-executing" been interpreted?

A different and rather more critical approach was adopted in Leger v. Stockton Unified School Dist. (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 1448, 249 Cal.Rptr. 688. There, a high school student sued a school district for having failed to protect him from an attack in a school rest room. The student alleged a cause of action under the provision in the state Constitution (art. I, 28, subd. (c)) which provides that students in public schools have a right to attend campuses which are safe.

The Leger court focused on the "self-executing" doctrine in the "sense" of whether the constitutional guarantee "provides citizens with a specific remedy by way of damages for its violation in the absence of legislation granting such a remedy." (202 Cal.App.3d at p. 1454, 249 Cal.Rptr. 688.) Leger reasoned that "self-executing" in the "sense of providing a specific method" of enforcement means that the constitutional provision supplies a "sufficient rule by means of which the right given may be enjoyed and protected." (Id. at p. 1455, 249 Cal.Rptr. 688, citing Older v. Superior Court (1910) 157 Cal. 770, 780, 109 P. 478, internal quotation marks omitted.) By contrast, a provision is not self-executing if it "merely indicates principles, without laying down rules by means of which those principles may be given the force of law." (Ibid.)