How has the common law interpreted the doctrine of a fee under common law?

It is also now quite generally conceded that this claim cannot be supported upon logic or principle, but is attempted to be upheld solely upon the ground of authority, and as a rule of property. Shaw v. Ford, 7 Ch. Div. 669. It seems to us impossible to conceive of a rule of property based upon a principle which has been the subject of so much controversy, and which has never, as we shall see from the authorities, commanded general acquiescence. A brief allusion to the general course of the law upon this branch of the subject in England will assist in illustrating the argument. There it has always been the doctrine of the common law that a remainder could not be limited upon a fee. This rule was predicated upon the presumed intention of the testator, it being argued that he had a certain interest in property to dispose of, and having devised that interest to one, there was nothing left for him to dispose of in favor of another. It followed that any attempt by the testator to create a remainder thereafter was ineffectual and void, as being reougnant