How has the Attorney General argued that appellants' constitutional rights were not violated in the context of a search warrant application?

Grasping upon the proposition that the Fourth Amendment does not protect an individual from every police trespass or intrusion, the Attorney General argues that appellants' constitutional rights were not violated in this case because at the time the transponder was being installed, the officers were not looking for or seeking out evidence concealed within the airplane. He asserts that 'traditionally' a search requires "prying into hidden places for that which is concealed" or "viewing . . . that which (is) . . . intended to be private." (People v. Superior Court (Mata) (1970) 3 Cal.App.3d 636, 639, 83 Cal.Rptr. 771; People v. Superior Court (Aslan) (1969) 2 Cal.App.3d 131, 134, 82 Cal.Rptr. 507.)

We agree with the premise that the Fourth Amendment does not protect the individual from every police trespass or intrusion. (See People v. Edwards (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1096, 1104, 80 Cal.Rptr. 633, 458 P.2d 713; People v. Terry (1969) 70 Cal.2d 410, 427, 77 Cal.Rptr. 460, 454 P.2d 36.) [67 Cal.App.3d 651] We do not agree, however, with the assumption that a search takes place only when the police are "prying into hidden places for that which is concealed" or "viewing . . . that which (is) . . . intended to be private." A search also can occur when police authorities violate one's reasonable expectation of privacy while engaging in an activity designed to gather evidence

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