California, United States of America
The following excerpt is from People v. Ward, A138750 (Cal. App. 2014):
" ' "Section 654 has been applied not only where there was but one 'act' in the ordinary sense . . . but also where a course of conduct violated more than one statute and the problem was whether it comprised a divisible transaction which could be punished under more than one statute within the meaning of section 654." [Citation.] [] Whether a course of criminal conduct is divisible and therefore gives rise to more than one act within the meaning of section 654 depends on the intent and objective of the actor. If all of the offenses were incident to one objective, the defendant may be punished for any one of such offenses but not for more than one.' [Citation.]" (People v. Rodriguez (2009) 47 Cal.4th 501, 507, italics omitted.)
"Whether section 654 applies in a given case is a question of fact for the trial court, which is vested with broad latitude in making its determination. [Citations.] Its findings will not be reversed on appeal if there is any substantial evidence to support them. [Citations.] We review the trial court's determination in the light most favorable to the respondent and presume the existence of every fact the trial court could reasonably
Page 6
deduce from the evidence. [Citation.]" (People v. Jones (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1143.)
"Whether a violation of [former] section 12021, forbidding persons convicted of felonies from possessing firearms concealable upon the person, constitutes a divisible transaction from the offense in which he employs the weapon depends upon the facts and evidence of each individual case. [Citation.] Thus where the evidence shows a possession distinctly antecedent and separate from the primary offense, punishment on both crimes has been approved. [Citations.] On the other hand, where the evidence shows a possession only in conjunction with the primary offense, then punishment for the illegal possession of the firearm has been held to be improper where it is the lesser offense. [Citations.]" (People v. Venegas (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 814, 821 (Venegas).) "[S]ection 654 is inapplicable when the evidence shows that the defendant arrived at the scene of his or her primary crime already in possession of the firearm." (People v. Jones, supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at p. 1145.)
Our Supreme Court applied these rules in People v. Bradford (1976) 17 Cal.3d 8 (Bradford). In Bradford, the defendant robbed a bank and was stopped minutes later for speeding by a highway patrol officer. The defendant took the officer's revolver and began shooting. The defendant was convicted of both possession of a concealable firearm by a felon and assault with a deadly weapon on a peace officer. (Id. at p. 13.) Because the "[d]efendant's possession of [the] revolver was not 'antecedent and separate' from his use of the revolver in assaulting the officer," the court concluded that the defendant's sentence for possession of a firearm by a felon should be stayed pursuant to section 654. (Id. at pp. 22-23.)
The above passage should not be considered legal advice. Reliable answers to complex legal questions require comprehensive research memos. To learn more visit www.alexi.com.