Does the trial court have an obligation to define the term "sustained" in its instruction to the jury?

The issue posed by the trial court's decision not to define "sustained" is more problematic. When the trial court initially instructed the jury, it submitted an instruction which essentially tracked the language of the statute ( 422) prohibiting the making of a terrorist threat. This was proper. "The language of a statute defining a crime . . . is generally an appropriate and desirable basis for an instruction, and is ordinarily sufficient when the defendant fails to request amplification. If the jury would have no difficulty in understanding the statute without guidance, the court need do no more than instruct in statutory language." (People v. Poggi (1988) 45 Cal.3d 306, 327.) At that point defense counsel made no request for a further definition of "sustained." Consequently, the court had no sua sponte obligation to define that word because it is a commonly understood word and was not being used in a technical sense peculiar to the law. (See, e.g., People v. Estrada (1995) 11 Cal.4th 568, 574-575.)