Does the term "sexual abuse" apply to the definition of the crime of sexual penetration?

Defendant has overlooked the fact that the term "sexual abuse" has been construed in the context of the substantial similar phrase "for the purpose of sexual arousal, gratification, or abuse," which is part of the definition of the crime of sexual penetration. In People v. White (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 193, which neither party cites, the defendant was convicted of violating former "section 289, subdivision (a), penetration of the anal opening by a foreign object accomplished against the victim's will by force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury for the purpose of sexual arousal, gratification or abuse." (Id. at p. 195, italics added.) Accepting that the word "sexual" qualified the word "abuse," the appellate court determined that "[t]he term 'abuse' imports an intent to injure or hurt badly, not lewdness" (id. at p. 205) and that "it is the nature of the act that renders the abuse 'sexual' and not the motivations of the perpetrator." (Id. at pp. 205-206.)

Section 289 currently defines "sexual penetration" as "the act of causing the penetration, however slight, of the genital or anal opening of any person or causing another person to so penetrate the defendant's or another person's genital or anal opening for the purpose of sexual arousal, gratification, or abuse by any foreign object, substance, instrument, or device, or by any unknown object." ( 289, subd. (k)(1), italics added.) In People v. McCoy (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1041, an appellate court stated that "the intent required to commit the act of sexual penetration includes an intent to abuse, meaning 'to injure or hurt badly, not lewdness.' (People v. White (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 193, 205.)" (Id. at p. 1541.)

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