Does the term "inhabited dwelling house" in section 459 of the California Penal Code apply to burglary of the first degree?

However, "inhabited dwelling house" does not appear in section 459, defining burglary. Indeed, even the term "dwelling house" does not appear in section 459. The term is used exclusively in section 460, subdivision (1), which provides in pertinent part, "Every burglary of an inhabited dwelling house ... is burglary of the first degree." In my view, "burglary of a residence" must be construed to mean "first degree burglary of an inhabited dwelling house." It is immaterial whether burglary of an inhabited dwelling house may or may not also be a second degree burglary. ³ (See People v. Lee (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 455, 197 Cal.Rptr. 766.) The statute defining second degree burglary does not refer to an "inhabited dwelling house," whereas the statute defining first degree burglary does. That difference in statutory language presents ambiguity. Indeed, the ambiguity is precisely what has produced "the already discordant appellate requiem for serious felonies and residential burglaries" among the courts of appeal, as the majority notes. The defendant is entitled to the benefit of every reasonable doubt in the construction of the statute. (In re Tartar, supra.) The statute must therefore be construed to refer to the more serious offense of first degree burglary. That is the end of the matter.