Does the rebuttable presumption (that a contract would have been concluded wholly in good faith) suffer from constitutional infirmity?

Nor does the rebuttable presumption (that a contract would have been concluded had the parties bargained wholly in good faith) suffer from [191 Cal.App.3d 1211] constitutional infirmity. "The rule is settled that a [rebuttable] presumption of one fact from evidence of another is violative of due process if there is no rational connection between the fact proved and the fact presumed. [Citations.] Courts have sometimes explained the rational connection requirement as meaning that, according to the teachings of experience, the proved fact must at least be a 'warning signal' of the presumed fact and have a 'sinister significance.' [Citation.]" (People v. Stevenson (1962) 58 Cal.2d 794, 797, 26 Cal.Rptr. 297, 376 P.2d 297.)