Does the prosecution's argument that a decision whether to stop at a yellow light constitute a "quick judgment" that is not a "calculated" decision?

Sanchez contends the prosecution's stop sign analogy misstated and trivialized the requirements for premeditation and deliberation. In People v. Avila (2009) 46 Cal.4th 680 (Avila) the prosecutor in a trial involving charges of first degree premeditated murder told the jury that the decision whether to stop or continue at a yellow light, a decision based on consideration of a number of factors, including assessments of distance and the location and speed of other vehicles, was an example of a "'quick judgment'" that was "'cold' and 'calculated.'" The prosecutor then stated, "'Deciding to and moving forward with the decision to kill is similar, but I'm not going to say in any way it's the same. There's great dire consequences that have a difference here.'" (Id. at p. 715.) In rejecting the defendant's assertion that the prosecutor had improperly equated the decision whether to stop at a yellow light with the kind of cold,

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