Does the participation of an undercover federal agent in a criminal enterprise in the criminal enterprise bar appellant from a conviction under the due process clause?

We agree with the district court that the participation of government agents in the criminal enterprise was not of such extent and character as to bar appellant's conviction under the due process clause. When the evidence is viewed most favorably to the government, it shows that appellant came to Phoenix to set up a car theft ring, began operating such an enterprise before he met with the undercover agent, and indicated to the agent that he wished to continue to pursue his illegal activity. The government agent did not exceed constitutional limits by providing appellant with an automobile dealer's license, access to salvage yards, and a police scanner at appellant's request in order to gain appellant's confidence and infiltrate his ongoing criminal enterprise. See United States v. Marcello, 731 F.2d 1354, 1357 (9th Cir.1984). Nor was it improper for the agent to purchase some of the stolen cars in order to return them to their owners. In sum, the evidence supported the conclusion that the government agent legitimately infiltrated appellant's criminal enterprise rather than creating and controlling a criminal enterprise in which appellant merely participated.