Does the modified version of CALCRIM 3450 instruct the jury that if appellant knew that his conduct was illegal, he was sane even if he did not know it was morally wrong?

Moreover, while defendant insists the "practical effect" of the modified version of CALCRIM 3450 was to instruct the jury that "that if appellant knew that his conduct was illegal, he was sane even if he did not know it was morally wrong," the instruction in fact gave the complete opposite charge. To wit, as set forth above, the jury in this case was told that defendant was legally insane if he had a mental disease or defect and, because of the disease or defect, he was incapable of knowing or understanding "that his act was morally or legally wrong." This use of the disjunctive term "or" in the instruction is not mere "legalese," as defendant claims. Rather, this commonly-used term makes clear to the average layperson that defendant's lack of awareness of either the moral wrongfulness or the legal wrongfulness of his conduct was, by itself, a sufficient basis for finding him legally insane. And, even assuming for the sake of argument the average layperson would not understand the trial court's use of the disjunctive to broaden the circumstances under which defendant could be found legally insane, the court's inclusion of the definition of "morally wrong" provided further clarity. This definition, also set forth above, states in no uncertain terms that legal and moral wrongfulness may be the same "but that is not always the case." Thus, there was no ambiguity or legal error with respect to the court's modification. (People v. Coddington, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 608 [" '[M]oral obligation in the context of the insanity defense means generally accepted moral standards and not those standards peculiar to the accused' "].)