Does the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada have any power or authority to determine whether a crime committed by an ethnic minority was committed on account of race?

In dispensing with a causation requirement, the majority wilfully disregards the well-settled law of this court. We have regularly rejected the proposition that persecutory conduct is "on account of" a statutorily protected characteristic just because the presence of that characteristic enhanced the probability that the persecutory conduct would occur. See, e.g., Singh v. INS, 134 F.3d 962, 970 (9th Cir. 1998) (acknowledging that ethnic Fijians were known to commit crimes against Indo-Fijians because of their race but rejecting the petitioner's allegation that crimes committed against her by persons who may have been ethnic Fijians were "on account of " her race); Sangha v. INS, 103 F.3d 1482, 1490 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting that, even if guerrillas had imputed opposing political opinion to petitioner, there was "no evidence" that the guerrillas' persecution of him was " `on account of' [his] political views").