California, United States of America
The following excerpt is from Graham v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 101 P.3d 140, 21 Cal.Rptr.3d 331, 34 Cal.4th 553 (Cal. 2004):
I agree that, because the majority adopts the catalyst theory for the first time today, it has just invented some of the rules in particular, the rule that a court that has never ruled on the merits should do so as part of the attorney fee litigation. Accordingly, to some degree, the limitations are new. But one critical requirement that plaintiffs show the lawsuit was actually necessary is not new. The majority tries to obfuscate this circumstance by saying the "Attorney General proposes" this rule. (Maj. opn., ante, 21 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 349, 101 P.3d at p. 155.) It hopes, no doubt, that the reader will infer that the Attorney General is proposing something new. But the Attorney General is not proposing something new. Rather, he is merely citing a requirement that has long existed. "[A]ttorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5, will not be awarded unless the plaintiff seeking such fees had reasonably endeavored to enforce the `important right affecting the public interest,' without litigation and its attendant expense." (Grimsley v. Board of Supervisors, supra, 169 Cal.App.3d at p. 966, 213 Cal.Rptr. 108 [denying attorney fees for failure to satisfy this requirement even though the plaintiff had won a final judgment].) This language is quite clear, and it was written in 1985, long before the events of this case. Accordingly, plaintiffs have always been on notice of this requirement. I see no reason, and the majority supplies none, to permit plaintiff to relitigate this question.
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