The following excerpt is from Boyd v. Constantine, 597 N.Y.S.2d 605, 613 N.E.2d 511, 81 N.Y.2d 189 (N.Y. 1993):
In this case, for example, the majority has focused on what these particular arresting officers "could * * * have foreseen, when they searched [petitioner's] vehicle" (majority opn., at 196, at 608 of 597 N.Y.S.2d, at 514 of 613 N.E.2d), rather than on the broader deterrent value of a rule that, in general, precludes the use of illegally obtained evidence in official proceedings aimed at penalizing the accused's misconduct. In so doing, the majority has trivialized the exclusionary rule and completely disregarded the rule's true purpose--to remove any significant incentives that our legal system may provide to law enforcement personnel who may be inclined to violate suspects' constitutional rights (Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 1692, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081).
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