Does the exclusionary rule apply to a probationer's home search?

We limited the holding in Tyrell J. in People v. Robles, supra, 23 Cal.4th 789, 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 914, 3 P.3d 311 in which we examined whether the warrantless search of the defendant's residence was proper because, unknown to the searching officers, a cohabitant was on probation and subject to a search condition. Police conducted an unlawful search of the defendant's garage and discovered a stolen car. The next day, police learned that the defendant's brother, who shared the apartment with the defendant, was on probation and was subject to a search condition. We held the search was unlawful, because the police violated the defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy by entering the garage without a warrant and without knowledge of the brother's search condition. (23 Cal.4th at p. 800, 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 914, 3 P.3d 311.)

We declined to extend the logic of Tyrell J. to validate the search of the garage, stating: "Even though a person subject to a search condition has a severely diminished expectation of privacy ... those who reside with such a person enjoy measurably greater privacy expectations in the eyes of society." (People v. Robles, supra, 23 Cal.4th 789, 798, 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 914, 3 P.3d 311.) We recognized that the extent of such a cohabitant's expectation of privacy hinged, in part, upon the searching officer's knowledge of the search condition: "[C]ohabitants need not anticipate that officers with no knowledge of the probationer's existence or search condition may freely invade their residence in the absence of a warrant or exigent circumstances. Thus, while cohabitants have no

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cause to complain of searches that are reasonably and objectively related to the purposes of probation ... they may legitimately challenge those searches that are not. Tyrell J., which focused specifically on the reasonableness of a probationer's privacy expectations, does not indicate otherwise." (Id. at p. 799, 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 914, 3 P.3d 311.)

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We then turned to the conclusion in Tyrell J. that its holding is consistent with the primary purpose of the exclusionary ruleto deter future unlawful police conduct. (In re Tyrell J., supra, 8 Cal.4th 68, 89, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 33, 876 P.2d 519.) We noted in Robles that "residential searches present an altogether different situation." (People v. Robles, supra, 23 Cal.4th 789, 800, 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 914, 3 P.3d 311.) "Notably, residences frequently are occupied by several people living together, including immediate family members and perhaps other relatives or friends, as well as guests. Allowing the People to validate a warrantless residential search, after the fact, by means of showing a sufficient connection between the residence and any one of a number of occupants who happens to be subject to a search clause, would encourage the police to engage in facially invalid searches with increased odds that a justification could be found later. It also would create a significant potential for abuse since the police, in effect, would be conducting searches with no perceived boundaries, limitations, or justification. [Citation.] The potential for abuse, with its consequent impact on the citizenry, is especially heightened in high crime areas where police might suspect probationers to live. Thus, while society generally has an interest in having all probative evidence before the court, in circumstances such as these a knowledge-first requirement is appropriate to deter future police misconduct and to effectuate the Fourth Amendment's guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures. [Citation.]" (Ibid.)