Does the exclusionary rule applicable to a claim of self-incrimination apply when a third party's statement is assertedly involuntary?

[95 Cal.Rptr.2d 428]

Our opinion in People v. Badgett, supra, 10 Cal.4th 330, 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 635, 895 P.2d 877, however, establishes that a defendant may not prevail simply by alleging that the challenged evidence was the fruit of an assertedly involuntary statement of a third person. In that case, we determined specifically that a defendant may not secure the exclusion of the trial testimony of a third party simply on the ground that it was the fruit of the third party's involuntary statement. (Id. at pp. 346, 348-350, 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 635, 895 P.2d 877.) We explained that when the defendant's claim is based upon the involuntariness of a third party's statement, the exclusionary rule applicable to a claimed violation of the privilege against self-incrimination does not apply. (Id. at p. 346, 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 635, 895 P.2d 877.) Rather, the defendant may prevail only by demonstrating fundamental unfairness at trial, normally by establishing that evidence to be produced at trial was made unreliable by coercion. (Id. at pp. 347-348, 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 635, 895 P.2d 877.)

[95 Cal.Rptr.2d 428]