Does the doctrine of alter ego apply as a defense to embezzlement?

It would be a perversion of the equitable origin of the doctrine of alter ego to employ it as a defense to embezzlement, as a means of promoting fraud. As observed in People v. Jones (1950) 36 Cal.2d 373, at 382, 224 P.2d 353, in a different context: "Defendant, having perpetrated a fraud through the device of a partnership, cannot escape criminal liability by reason of that same device."

As a separate basis for rejecting this defense, it is established that a person who acts as an agent of a corporation is estopped to deny its separate corporate status (Wynn v. Treasure Co. (1956) 146 Cal.App.2d 69, 76, 303 P.2d 1067; see People v. Leonard (1895) 106 Cal. 302, 310, 39 P. 617).