Does the definition of when a trial commences apply only for purposes of subdivision (b)(1) of the Evidence Code?

Evidence Code section 12 explicitly directs that its definition of when trial commences applies only for purposes of subdivision (b). "The only function of Evidence Code section 12, subdivision (b)(1) is to demark which proceedings are governed by the Evidence Code enacted in 1967 and which may proceed under earlier rules. Indeed at this stage, ... years after enactment of the code, section 12, subdivision (b)(1) probably has no practical effect. In essence the section meant that unless a witness had been sworn or an exhibit admitted before January 1, 1967, the proceedings had to comply with the 'new' Evidence Code. That definition made perfect sense given the policies it implemented. If no evidence had yet been taken, there was no reason to exempt a trial from the new evidence rules, even if voir dire had started or been completed. But if some evidence had been introduced under the old law it was deemed unwise to shift rules in midstream and the trial was allowed to continue under the prior evidence provisions." (People v. Lewis, supra, 144 Cal.App.3d 267, 278, 192 Cal.Rptr. 257.)

Therefore, the purpose of the definition in Evidence Code section 12 as to when trial commences within the meaning of that statute has no relevance to the vastly different purpose of section 1043, which is intended to prevent a defendant from intentionally frustrating the orderly processes of his trial by voluntarily absenting himself from the courtroom. (People v. Lewis, supra, 144 Cal.App.3d at p. 278, 192 Cal.Rptr. 257.)