Does the Defendant's refusal to allow a tape recorder to be recorded during an interview constitute an invocation of his right to remain silent?

California, United States of America


The following excerpt is from People v. Johnson, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 593, 6 Cal.4th 1, 859 P.2d 673 (Cal. 1993):

Defendant asserts his remarks showed he was unwilling to "freely and completely" discuss his case with the police. (See People v. Burton (1971) 6 Cal.3d 375, 382, 99 Cal.Rptr. 1, 491 P.2d 793; People v. Randall (1970) 1 Cal.3d 948, 956, 83 Cal.Rptr. 658, 464 P.2d 114.) We find the foregoing cases inapposite. They recite the familiar rule that police interrogation must [6 Cal.4th 26] cease once the defendant, by words or conduct, demonstrates a desire to invoke his right to remain silent, or to consult with an attorney. Neither case, however, stands for the proposition that a defendant automatically invokes those rights by imposing conditions (such as "no tape recorder") governing the conduct of the interview.

Defendant contends that prior cases have held a suspect's refusal to permit a tape-recorded interview constitutes an invocation of his right to remain silent. (See People v. Hinds (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 222, 235-236, 201 Cal.Rptr. 104; People v. Nicholas (1980) 112 Cal.App.3d 249, 268, 169 Cal.Rptr. 497.) In both these cases, however,

Page 605

In the present case, by contrast, the trial court found no such clear intent on defendant's part. Although defendant asked that the proceedings go "off the record" at various points during the interviews, he expressed no general expectation of privacy covering the entire interview. (We discuss in a subsequent part of this opinion defendant's separate contention that his request for "off-the-record" treatment required the officers to terminate further questioning.) As another recent case observes, "it was for the trial court to determine whether [the defendant's] refusal to ... be recorded was in fact an invocation of his right to silence. The court found [the defendant] in fact had understood his rights and waived them, and his conversations with the officers were therefore voluntary. Such a conclusion was reasonable, and we will not disturb it on this appeal. [Citations.]" (People v. Maier (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 1670, 1678, 277 Cal.Rptr. 667.)

Other Questions


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If a suspect waives his Miranda right to remain silent during an interrogation, can the suspect remain silent? (California, United States of America)
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When a defendant waives his right to be present at trial by refusing to leave the courtroom, does he have a right to remain in the courtroom? (California, United States of America)
Is there any case law where a defendant's post-arrest invocation of a right to remain silent is reversible error? (California, United States of America)
Is a defendant competent to stand trial if he was confused by the court's explanation of the Fifth Amendment right to remain silent as it related to his right to testify? (California, United States of America)
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