Does the court have any authority to refer to knowledge of the identity of respondent at the time appellant filed a complaint?

Moreover, even had the court not intended to refer to appellant's knowledge at the time the complaint was filed, "where the decision of a lower court is correct on any theory of law applicable to the case, the judgment or order must be affirmed regardless of the correctness of the grounds upon which the lower court reached its conclusion. [Citation.]" (In re Conservatorship of Davidson (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 1035, 1056; see also Estate of Beard (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 753, 777 ["In short, we will affirm a judgment or order if it is correct on any theory of law applicable to the case, even if it is right for the wrong reasons"], disapproved on another ground in Bernard v. Foley (2006) 39 Cal.4th 794, 816, fn. 14.) In light of our finding that the record contains substantial evidence showing that appellant was aware of respondent's identity at the time he filed his original complaint, we need not address his alternative argument that he did not unreasonably delay in filing and serving the amendment to the complaint after he learned of respondent's identity.