Does the challenged portion of the DROS fee, which is challenged in the context of the Second Amendment, need to be considered within the scope of the Amendment?

We need not decide this question because the challenged portion of the DROS fee would survive heightened scrutiny even if it implicates Second Amendment protections. Therefore, for purposes of this analysis, we assume, without deciding, that the challenged fee burdens conduct falling within the scope of the Second Amendment. See Silvester v. Harris , 843 F.3d 816, 82627 (9th Cir. 2016) (assuming without deciding that waiting period laws fall within the scope of the Second Amendment at step one); Fyock v. Sunnyvale , 779 F.3d 991, 997 (9th Cir. 2015) (bypassing step one because firing-capacity regulations would survive heightened scrutiny even if they fell within the scope of the Second Amendment).