Does the "captain of the ship" rule give counsel exclusive control over whether to waive a jury trial?

" It is axiomatic, of course, that cases are not authority for propositions not considered. " ( People v. Jones (1995) 11 Cal.4th 118, 123, fn. 2, 44 Cal.Rptr.2d 164, 899 P.2d 1358, quoting People v. Gilbert (1969) 1 Cal.3d 475, 482, fn. 7, 82 Cal.Rptr. 724, 462 P.2d 580.) Thus, these cases do not support a conclusion that in NGI proceedings, the "captain of the ship" rule gives counsel exclusive control over whether to waive a jury trial. Insofar as Otis appears to imply as much, we disagree.