Does the Attorney General have any interest in the issue of the suppression of tangible evidence?

Secondly, the Attorney General states in his brief that "We disclaim any interest in the issue of the admissibility of the suppressed tangible evidence"; rather, he assertedly challenges the superior court's ruling on that issue only in order to defend its subsequent decision to admit defendant's confession, "but for a slightly different reason." This disingenuous understatement, however, cannot hide the fact that the Attorney General is nevertheless vigorously attacking the suppression ruling, and that to permit him to do so for any reason "on theories thereafter invented for the consumption of reviewing courts" (People v. Superior Court (Simon) (1972) 7 Cal.3d 186, 198, 101 Cal.Rptr. 837, 496 P.2d 1205) would frustrate the purposes of both Penal Code section 1538.5 (Lorenzana, 9 Cal.3d at p. 640, 108 Cal.Rptr. 585, 511 P.2d 33) and the exclusionary rule itself (Simon, 7 Cal.3d at p. 198, 101 Cal.Rptr. 837, 496 P.2d 1205), and deprive the defendant of a fair opportunity to fully litigate his case in the appropriate forum (id. at pp. 198-199, 101 Cal.Rptr. 837, 496 P.2d 1205).