Does the Attorney General have any grounds to deny a motion in limine to suppress statements elicited in an interrogation?

Appellant argues that it was error for the trial court to deny a motion in limine (Evid.Code, 402) to suppress the statements elicited in this interrogation. The Attorney General responds that the trial judge made findings that "One, the defendant was given his Miranda rights, and said that he understood them. Two, that the defendant never asked for an attorney. And three, that he wanted to and intended to tell his version of the event." He argues that these findings are dispositive of the Miranda issue. The trial court's findings are to be accepted by this court if not "palpably erroneous." (People v. Duren (1973) 9 Cal.3d 218, 238, 107 Cal.Rptr. 157, 507 P.2d 1365.) Here, as we shall explain, the trial court's determination that there was no Miranda violation was indeed palpably erroneous.