California, United States of America
The following excerpt is from People v. Montalvan, A145667 (Cal. App. 2017):
Section 667.6, subdivision (c) does not define "same occasion." We are guided by subdivision (d), however, which mandates that a trial court impose a "full, separate, and consecutive term . . . for each violation of an offense specified in subdivision (e) if the crimes involve separate victims or involve the same victim on separate occasions."10 As to what constitutes separate occasions, the subdivision goes on to say: "[T]he court shall consider whether, between the commission of one sex crime and another, the defendant had a reasonable opportunity to reflect upon his or her actions and nevertheless resumed sexually assaultive behavior. Neither the duration of time between crimes, nor whether or not the defendant lost or abandoned his or her opportunity to attack, shall be, in and of itself, determinative on the issue of whether the crimes in question occurred on separate occasions." Conversely, then, it stands to reason that where defendant did not, between the commission of one sex crime and another, have a reasonable opportunity to reflect upon his or her actions and nevertheless resumed sexually assaultive behavior, the two sex crimes occurred on the same occasion. (See People v. Solis (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1210, 1220 ["Although this language does not make [reasonable opportunity to reflect between the crimes] a litmus test for determining the issue, the courts have nevertheless
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