California, United States of America
The following excerpt is from People v. Baker, 169 Cal.App.3d 58, 215 Cal.Rptr. 293 (Cal. App. 1985):
We find no merit in defendant's claim that a violation of the constitutional guarantee of the equal protection of the laws will necessarily occur unless sections 667.6, subdivision (a), and 667, subdivision (a), are applied in the identical manner in order to insure that persons previously convicted of violent sexual offenses are accorded exactly the same treatment as persons previously convicted of serious felonies. The following language from People v. Karsai (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 224, 243-244, 182 Cal.Rptr. 406, is controlling here: "The basic rule of equal protection is that those persons similarly situated with respect to the legitimate purpose of the law must receive like treatment. [Citation.] It is in this regard that defendant's argument must be rejected. He has chosen too broad a class for equal protection analysis. Defendant is not merely a person convicted of a violent offense; he is a person convicted of multiple violent sex offenses [169 Cal.App.3d 63] with multiple prior convictions of the same type. Violent sex offenses differ from other types of offenses in many ways, including the reasons and motive of the criminal, the outrage and harm to the victim, and the potential for danger to the victim and society in general. These differences compel different treatment. We conclude that violent sex offenders are not similarly situated with other offenders and thus may be treated differently. [Citation.]"
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