Does section 664(a) of the California Constitution bar a defendant from a retrial on an allegation that he committed first degree attempted murder?

In People v. Bright, supra, 12 Cal.4th 652, 49 Cal.Rptr .2d 732, 909 P.2d 1354, the question that we addressed was whether, for purposes of the double jeopardy clauses of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and section 15 of article I of the California Constitution, section 664(a), by providing for life imprisonment as the punishment for an attempted murderer when the murder attempted was willful, deliberate, and premeditated, creates a "greater degree of attempted murder" in the form of "`first degree attempted murder'" or, instead, constitutes a "penalty provision" increasing punishment for attempted murder beyond the maximum otherwise prescribed. (People v. Bright, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 656, 49 Cal.Rptr.2d 732, 909 P.2d 1354, italics omitted.)

After carefully analyzing the language and purpose of section 664(a), we concluded in Bright that section 664(a) in fact constitutes a penalty provision increasing the punishment for attempted murder beyond the maximum otherwise prescribed, and does not create a greater degree of attempted murder. We further concluded that a jury verdict finding the defendant guilty of attempted murder, without any finding on an allegation that the murder attempted was willful, deliberate, and premeditated, did not amount to an acquittal of a so-called, but nonexistent, greater degree of attempted murder, and therefore concluded that the double jeopardy clauses of the federal and state Constitutions did not bar retrial on the allegation in question. (People v. Bright, supra, 12 Cal.4th at pp. 656-657, 49 Cal.Rptr.2d 732, 909 P.2d 1354.)