Does Section 422.6 of the Freedom of Information Act, which prohibits acts such as vandalism, discrimination, harassment, assault and vandalism constitute "expression/conduct" or "expression"?

In re M.S. did not deal with subdivision (b) of section 422.6. Nonetheless, the court's rationale applies equally to it as the acts it proscribes are activities "clearly falling closer to the conduct end of the expression/conduct continuum."³³ In addition, it is untenable that conduct such as vandalism is protected by the First Amendment merely because those engaged in such conduct intend thereby to express an idea.³⁴ The statute is directed at regulating conduct that is unprotected by the First Amendment.³⁵ In Wisconsin v. Mitchell, the defendant assaulted a victim based on his race. The physical assault was not "by any stretch of the imagination expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment."³⁶