Does section 190.3 of the California Criminal Code, which prohibits the use of the death penalty, have any constitutional implications?

Even though in People v. Brown, supra, 40 Cal.3d at pages 538-544, 230 Cal.Rptr. 834, 726 P.2d 516, we rejected the claim that section 190.3 is unconstitutional, "We acknowledge[d] that the language of the statute, and in particular the words 'shall impose a sentence of death,' leave room for some confusion as to the jury's role," and added that "indeed, such confusion is occasionally reflected in records before this court." (Id. at p. 544, fn. 17, 230 Cal.Rptr. 834, 726 P.2d 516.) For that very reason, we directed that "trial courts in future death penalty trials ... instruct the jury as to the scope of its discretion and responsibility in accordance with the principles set forth in [Brown ]." (Ibid.) We made it clear, however, that "We pass[ed] no judgment ... upon the validity of death penalty verdicts previously rendered without benefit of ... the instructions we [then] require[d]." (Ibid.) We concluded that "Each such prior case must be examined on its own merits to determine whether, in context, the sentencer may have been misled to defendant's prejudice about the scope of its sentencing discretion under the 1978 law." (Ibid.)