California, United States of America
The following excerpt is from People v. Horning, 150 Cal.App.3d 1015, 198 Cal.Rptr. 384 (Cal. App. 1984):
[150 Cal.App.3d 1023] Nonetheless, even without the guidance of Ramos, the literal terms of section 1387 in our view required defense counsel to attempt the motion for dismissal. California case law suggests that a reading of section 1387 alone should have prompted counsel to make a motion to dismiss under the circumstances presented here. For example, in Lee v. Superior Court, supra, 142 Cal.App.3d 637, 191 Cal.Rptr. 361, a first dismissal followed the improper denial of a motion for continuance of the preliminary hearing. Thereafter, a conspiracy count (Pen.Code, 182, subd. 1), was dismissed. 5 Holding that the changes were "twice-dismissed" within the obvious meaning of section 1387, the court observed that: "[A] plain reading of the statute does not make any distinction as to the reason of the dismissal. The fact [that] the exceptions to the operation of the statute deal with procedural rather than substantive questions leads to the inescapable conclusion that all dismissals, whether on the merits or for procedural deficiencies, are included." (Id. at p. 640, 191 Cal.Rptr. 361; emphasis added.) Certainly, in light of the broad language of the statute, it would have taken no prescience on the part of
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