California, United States of America
The following excerpt is from People v. Cardoza, F060675 (Cal. App. 2012):
Further, even if we were to assume for the sake of argument this latter interpretation is also a reasonable construction of section 1170.1, subdivision (c), we would choose the interpretation that is more favorable to defendant. "[W]e must ... adhere to the ... well-settled principle of statutory interpretation that '"[w]hen language which is reasonably susceptible of two constructions ... in a penal law[,] ordinarily that construction which is more favorable to the offender will be adopted. [] The defendant is entitled to the benefit of every reasonable doubt, whether it [arises] out of a question of fact, or as to the true interpretation of the words or the construction of language used in a statute." [Citations.]' [Citation.]" (People v. Arant, supra, 199 Cal.App.3d at p. 297.)
We are not persuaded by the People's arguments that section 1170.1, subdivision (c), should apply in this case. The People observe that the purpose of the statute is to punish in-prison offenses more harshly than offenses committed out of prison. (See, e.g., People v. White (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 862, 869 ["The Legislature wanted in-prison crimes to be punished more severely than crimes committed 'on the outside'"].) Yet, it is not the case that every in-prison offense is sentenced as a full principal term. For example, in People v. Venegas (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1731, 1744, the court held that, after a defendant has been sentenced under section 1170.1, subdivision (c), to a full principal term for an in-prison offense, that defendant may not be sentenced to another full principal term for a later in-prison offense committed while
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