Does reckless driving constitute a criminal offence for purposes of section 1159 of the Penal Code?

3 The possibility is not foreclosed that, under some circumstances, reckless driving might be an offense 'necessarily included' within the meaning of and for purposes of section 1159 of the Penal Code depending upon the specific allegations in the accusatory pleadings or the evidence developed at the trial. (See People v. Marshall, 48 Cal.2d 394, 402--405, 309 P.2d 456.)

4 In the briefs, defendant asserts that the Orange County District Attorney's office was responsible for prosecution of both the misdemeanor and the felony charges and that said office was fully aware of the pendency of both proceedings at all times. The only thing in the record indicating that the district attorney's office was in any way connected with the misdemeanor prosecution are the entries in the court's minutes, consisting of a form made by impression from a rubber stamp, in connection with defendant's two appearances on July 15 which read 'People represented by District Attorney _ _.' If the district attorney's office was in fact represented on July 15, one would expect to find the name of the deputy written or printed in the blank space. On the other hand, the district attorney asserts that two different governmental entities filed the charges. This is born out by the record only to the limited extent that the reckless driving citation is on a form of the City of Westminster. The record does not disclose what agency or person filed the complaint giving rise to the information. In any event, under the statute, the pronouncement of judgment is the operative fact which bars subsequent prosecution (People v. Tideman, Supra, 57 Cal.2d 574, 587, 21 Cal.Rptr. 207, 370 P.2d 1007), and there is no indication in the court's minutes or elsewhere in the record that the district attorney was represented at that proceeding.