Does lack of standing constitute a "favorable termination" on the merits of an action?

The trial court's anti-SLAPP ruling explained that "'lack of standing' is not a favorable termination on the merits pursuant to Hudis v. Crawford (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1586, 1592 [Hudis], but rather a 'jurisdictional defect.'" Hudis noted that lack of standing may be "'a technical or procedural defense'" in a particular case, and therefore "unrelated to the merits" of the action. (Ibid.) A plaintiff's dismissal based on a standing issue therefore may not operate as "'a concession that [the defendants] had done nothing wrong, but merely . . . that [he or she was] no longer in a position to complain of their wrongdoing.'" (Id. at p. 1591.) Such a concession does not reflect on the merits of the underlying action. (Ibid.)

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