Does free speech and press immunity extend to speech or writing used as an integral part of conduct in violation of a valid criminal statute?

In Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498, 69 S.Ct. 684, 688, 93 L.Ed. 834, it is stated: 'It rarely has been suggested that the constitutional freedom for speech and press extends its immunity to speech or writing used as an [276 Cal.App.2d 677] integral part of conduct in violation of a valid criminal statute. * * *'

In Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 85 S.Ct. 476, 13 L.Ed.2d 487, the court was concerned with a criminal statute proscribing a parade near a courthouse for the purpose, among other things, of impeding the administration of justice of influencing a judge or juror. The court said (p. 564, 85 S.Ct. p. 481): 'We hold that this statute on its face is a valid law dealing with conduct subject to regulation so as to vindicate important interests of society and that the fact that free speech is intermingled with such conduct does not bring with it constitutional protection.'